Problem
Non-verificability of compliance with nuclear power safeguards
Other Names:
Refusal of international inspection of nuclear sitesSecrecy in the nuclear power industry
Nature:
The non-military uses of nuclear power involve the hazards of accidents at sites near international borders, the possibility of nuclear power plants being targets of sabotage or of acts of war, and the diversion of nuclear materials from commercial or civil applications to surreptitious weapons manufacture. There are no adequate means of inspecting for violations or hazards by international agreement. Incidence:
In May 1984, nuclear experts from 19 countries agreed on guidelines under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency to deal with the accidental release of radioactive materials across national boundaries. The IAEA is a purely advisory body with no enforcement powers. The guidelines can be and are ignored at the convenience of national governments, as the USSR did at the time of the Chernobyl accident. Related Problems:
Environmental secrecy Aggravates:
Plutonium pollutionRadiation accidentsNuclear reactor accidentsInadequate building inspectionNuclear power station irradiationInternationally non-cooperative governmentsReduction in building of nuclear power stationsIneffective official inspection of regulated activities Strategies:
Complying with nuclear power safeguardsRefusing international inspection of nuclear sitesAccepting inspection of nuclear sitesMaintaining secrecy in the nuclear power industryExposing secrecy in the nuclear power industry Subject(s):
Resources → EnergyIndustry → Industry
Societal Problems → Protection
Societal Problems → Deprivation
Research, Standards → Inspection, tests
Defence → Secrecy
Cybernetics → Control
Related UN Sustainable Development Goals:
Problem Type:
F: Fuzzy exceptional problems Date of last update
22.04.1997 – 00:00 CEST