1. Global strategies
  2. Securing bomb-grade nuclear material from the former Soviet Union

Securing bomb-grade nuclear material from the former Soviet Union

Context

Substantial quantities of bomb-grade nuclear materials are scattered in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Security precautions against the possible theft of such nuclear materials are inadequate. This is a serious security threat to the world. Stolen bomb-grade nuclear materials can be used by terrorists, factions, or countries with nuclear ambitions. Whilst the security of bomb-grade nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union remains in question, the immediate securing of bomb-grade nuclear materials is achieved by its acquisition by nuclear states with secure systems.

Implementation

In 1994, a total of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, originally produced in the Soviet Union, were shipped from Kazakhstan to the United States. In Kazakhstan, the large cache of bomb-grade uranium (enough to make 20 to 25 nuclear weapons) had been stored in a factory employing more than 14,000 people, but without any high-tech safeguards. The presence or absence of uranium was merely noted by hand in record books, instead of using substantially more secure methods such as chemical assays and radiation sensors. The securing of the bomb-grade nuclear material by the United States prevents it from being stolen, smuggled and finding its way to terrorists or States with nuclear ambitions.

Broader

Constrains

Facilitates

Facilitated by

Problem

Nuclear war
Excellent

Value

Union
Yet to rate
Acquisition
Yet to rate

Metadata

Database
Global strategies
Type
(E) Emanations of other strategies
Subject
  • Fundamental sciences » Material
  • Defence » Arms
  • Content quality
    Yet to rate
     Yet to rate
    Language
    English
    Last update
    Dec 3, 2024