Undermining nuclear non-proliferation
Implementation: The post-Cold War era permits the five officially recognized nuclear powers to pursue nuclear disarmament and to undermine nuclear proliferation within non-nuclear states who may have nuclear weapons ambitions. The likelihood that a number of non-nuclear states may have nuclear ambitions has been made more probable by the fact that the post-Cold War era's direction is uncertain and has so far proven to be one of numerous violent small conflicts. In such an international climate, the nuclear weapons states ought to be obliged and must decisively demonstrate their own commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in "all its possible forms", in order to have "the (moral) justification" and "the deterrent effect" to undermine nuclear proliferation in non-nuclear states. Nuclear weapons states must safeguard their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons usable material against theft, and prevent the export of their own nuclear technologies, and related personnel to non-nuclear states, particularly those that may have nuclear ambitions. However, nuclear weapons states have and are faltering in this obligation to humanity, indeed, some have even moved the opposite direction (nuclear testing by France) or continue to move in the opposite direction (China). The current undermining of nuclear non-proliferation is to say the least highly irresponsible. Those countries bear the consequences.
Type Classification: F: Exceptional strategies