Transnational corporations tend to fix prices of goods and services traded between the corporation and its affiliates located in different countries. Intracorporate transfer pricing by a multiregional company within a country may matter little to a national government, unless it is a restrictive business practice, since all the benefits of the transaction are retained domestically. When engaged in by transnational corporations, however, it affects the distribution of the benefits of their activities between countries, and may stifle local competition.
Moreover, such abuses in transfer prices for intra-firm trade may also be reflected in the prices charged subsequently to third parties by the selling unit of the corporation, and occur in respect both of the prices of goods for resale without further transformation and of goods which are further manufactured using inputs supplied on an intra-firm basis. Manipulations of transfer prices are in consequence likely to have an adverse effect on market and industrial structures and on the balance of payments of either the home or the host countries in which transnational corporations operate.
The use of transfer pricing by transnational corporations is particularly problematic for developing countries since they are most often the host country. The particular conditions in developing countries inducive to high transfer prices (ie above arm's length prices) for flows from parents to foreign subsidiaries include the following: corporate income tax higher than in parent's country; political pressures to nationalize or expropriate high-profit foreign firms; political instability; high inflation rate; currency fluctuations; exchange controls; and import/export price controls, tariffs and subsidies.